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I. INTRODUCTION
After years of denial, the truth finally came out: The CIA carried
out “brutal” interrogations of al-Qaeda suspects, involving extensive
waterboarding described as a “series of near drownings,” sleep
deprivation of up to a week, and medically unnecessary forced
feedings.1 Unequivocally, and undeniably, what was conducted in
the name of national security was torture, which is fundamentally
opposed to the United States’ values. Much of these abuses occurred
at the secret prisons located at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where the
government believed that the reach and protections of the
Constitution did not extend. After years of wrangling between
Congress and the Supreme Court the Supreme Court definitively
ruled in 2008 that the detainees held at Guantanamo were protected
by the Suspension Clause.2 Since then, debate has raged among legal
scholars about what other protections may apply to the detainees.
Additionally, Boumediene sparked a wide variety of lawsuits,
challenging the government’s practices.
A particularly prevalent type of claims in post-Boumediene cases
are Bivens claims by detainees. One such case is Hamad v. Gates.3
Hamad represents a typical claim made by such detainees, and is the
focus of this note. In Hamad, the Ninth Circuit held that a statute
that had previously thought to be entirely overruled by Boumediene
actually survived. This statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e), stemmed from
years of back-and-forth debate between the Supreme Court and
Congress. The result of this conflict is still unsettled. The main issue
is whether the Court’s primary concern in overruling the jurisdictionstripping statutes of Congress was in a separation-of-powers and a

* Third-year law student, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1
Jeremy Asheknas, Hannah Fairfield, Josh Keller, and Paul Volpe, 7 Key
Points From the C.I.A. Torture Report, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014)
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/12/09/world/cia-torture-report-keypoints.html.
2
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008).
3
732 F.3d at 990.
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muscular enforcement of judicial protections, or a more limited,
Suspension-Clause specific analysis.
In Part II, this note will examine the historical background of the
Military Commissions, the Detainee Treatment Act, and the Military
Commissions Act.4 It will also provide the Supreme Court’s
responses to each of these, illustrating how each time the Court
enforced its own jurisdiction to hear cases at Guantanamo finally
culminated in the full application of the Suspension Clause in
Boumediene.5 It will also explain the relevant post-Boumediene case
law, as well as Bivens actions and how detainees attempt to assert
such actions for money damages against the government.6 These
actions are significant because if such a Bivens claim is recognized,
some constitutional protection that has been violated would also have
to be recognized.7 Part III of this note will examine the facts leading
up to Hamad’s claim, including his allegations of cruel, inhumane,
and degrading treatment (CIDT), and his subsequent release without
any charge.8 Part IV will examine the District Court for the Western
District of Washington’s decision, which has been noted as the only
court to hold that a detainee had a Bivens claim.9 Part V will
examine the Ninth Circuit’s holding that § 2241(e)(2) was not
overruled in Boumediene, including its application of the severability
doctrine, as well as the holding that Bivens claims are never
constitutionally required.10 Part VI will examine the legal and social
impact of Bivens claims’ denials.11 Finally, I will briefly conclude
that courts should be more receptive towards acknowledging money
damages for detainees as a way of protecting Americans from abuses
by the government.12

4

See infra Part II.
See id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See infra Part III.
9
See infra Part IV.
10
See infra Part V.
11
See infra Part VI.
12
See infra Part VII.
5
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. September 11th and the Authorization for Use of Military
Force of 2001
On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda agents hijacked four
commercial airplanes and attacked the World Trade Center in New
York City, the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and crashed the
fourth airplane into a field in Pennsylvania.13 These attacks resulted
in the deaths of nearly 3,000 civilians.14 Following the attacks,
Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks.”15 Since then, the United States has been in armed conflict
with the perpetrators of that attack, al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well
as other terrorist organizations.16 As opposed to more traditional
forms of warfare, with uniformed armies of nation-states fighting
each other, this conflict has been different: Al-Qaeda and similarly
affiliated groups have a worldwide presence and the ability to
execute attacks internationally “with a magnitude and sophistication
never before seen from a non-state actor.”17 Though the United
States had the authority under both international and domestic law to
take military actions against al-Qaeda and its supporters,18 the

13

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006).
Id.
15
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107- 40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
16
Charles A. Allen, Alternatives To Prosecution For War Crimes in the War
on Terrorism, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 122 (2008).
17
Allen, supra note 16, at 122.
18
AUMF, supra note 15. The collective self-defense provision of the North
Atlantic Treaty provided that if an armed attack occurred against one of the parties
in Europe or North America, the others will exercise the right of individual or
collective self-defense. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241,
2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246. In a statement by NATO the day after the September
11 attack, the North Atlantic Council agreed that if the attack was determined to
have been directed from abroad, it would be covered by Article 5. Press Release,
14
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position of individuals detained in the course of the conflict was less
clear. The law of war recognizes the right to detain enemy lawful and
unlawful combatants until the end of the conflict.19 However, in
contrast to a traditional war, the current conflict is not one that will
have a single definite end.20 Detainees captured in the course of the
conflict therefore potentially an indefinite detention.21
After October 7, 2001, U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan, and
captured and detained thousands of individuals that it alleged were
enemy combatants.22 The next year, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld announced that some of the al-Qaeda and Taliban
combatants captured in Afghanistan would be detained by the
Department of Defense (DOD) at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.23 The
next day, Secretary Rumsfeld alleged that because these detainees
had fought without uniforms or insignias and had chosen innocent
civilians as their targets, they were “unlawful enemy combatants
[who] do not have any rights under the Geneva Convention.”24 At its
North Atlantic Council, Statement by the North Atlantic Council, (2001)124 (Sep.
15, 2001) http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm.
19
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (“The capture and detention
of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful combatants,
by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war”) (citing
Ex parte Quirin, 63 S.Ct. 2, 28, 30 (1942)) (alteration in original).
20
Allen, supra note 14, at 122-123.
21
Id.
22
Alissa J. Kness, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: An Unconstitutional
Response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 52 S.D. L. REV. 382, 383 (2007).
23
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News
Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers (Jan. 3, 2002),
http://archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1046. Secretary
Rumsfeld said that at that point, the U.S. had 248 detainees in various locations in
Afghanistan, and that they would begin moving the detainees to Cuba as soon as
the base was constructed. Id.
24
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec’y of Def., Department of Defense News
Briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers (Jan. 11, 2002),
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2031. Common
Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 provides that:
Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those place [out of
combat] by . . . detention . . . shall in all circumstances be treated
humanely. . . . To this end the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the
above mentioned persons:
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height, Guantanamo housed over 770 such detainees, but of those,
only ten received formal charges for crimes.25 Many observers
questioned the combatant status of the detainees because the majority
were turned over by militias and civilians in Afghanistan and
Pakistan in return for substantial bounties offered in exchange for alQaeda or Taliban forces.26
B. Hamdi, Rasul and the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
Before 2004, no systematic effort had been made by the DOD or
the military to determine if the detainees held at Guantanamo were
combatants, in which case the Geneva protections27 applied, or
unlawful non-combatants not entitled to such protections.28 In
November 2001, President George W. Bush issued an Executive
Order stating that he intended to detain and try individuals captured

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of
executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
25
Michael Greenberger, You Ain’t Seen Nothin’ Yet: The Inevitable PostHamdan Conflict Between the Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 66 MD.
L. REV. 805, 816 (2007).
26
Id. at 816-17. Many commentators have speculated that “the financial
incentives for capture overwhelmed the true non-combatant nature of those
detained.” Id. The military offered cash bounties as high as $5,000 for any Taliban
member and up to $20,000 for any member of al-Qaeda. Kness, supra note 22, at
383. “In fact, 86 [percent] of the detainees captured . . . were handed over to the
United States at a time in which the United States offered large bounties for the
capture of suspected enemies.” Id. (quoting Mark Denbeaux, Joshua Denbeaux &
Seton Hall Students, Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees
Through Analysis of Department of Defense Data (Feb. 6, 2006) http://
law.shu.edu/news/Guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf.).
27
See Geneva Convention art. 3, supra note 24.
28
Greenberger, supra note 25, at 818.
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in Afghanistan and elsewhere in military tribunals.29 The President
would “from time to time” determine whom would be subject to the
order (and not whether the person was a combatant), however, no
process was created for detainees to object to their detention.30 The
“bare-bones” Executive Order, and the DOD’s attempts to implement
it, were sharply criticized by the American Bar Association.31
Additionally, the abuses the detainees suffered as well as the harsh
interrogation practices at Guantanamo received worldwide
condemnation.32 Importantly, the detainees had no access to legal
counsel, nor any way to address the reason for their detention.
In 2004, the Supreme Court issued two momentous decisions. In
Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that federal courts have jurisdiction
over “challenges to the legality of the detention of foreign nationals
captured abroad in connection with hostilities and incarcerated at . . .

29

Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 16,
2001).
30
Id. at 57834. See also Greenberger, supra note 25, at 817 (stating that the
Afghanistan conflict was “the first conflict since the advent of the Geneva
Conventions in 1949 where the United States military did not convene battlefield
tribunals to determine whether those captured were properly classified as
combatants or prisoners of war or were innocent civilians”).
31
Letter from Karen J. Mathis, President, American Bar Association, to MG
John D. Altenburg, Jr. USA (Ret.), Appointing Authority, Office of Military
Commissions (Oct. 20, 2006)
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/poladv/letters/antiterror/061
020letter_milcom_dod.authcheckdam.pdf. The lack of instruction on how to
proceed with the commission meant that the DOD was “repeatedly forced to revise
the military commission structure,” publishing “two separate military orders and
ten military commission instructions outlining practices and procedures.”
Greenberger, supra note 25, at 822.
32
See, e.g., Foreign Affairs Committee, Visit to Guantanamo Bay, 2006-7,
H.C. 44-2, at 37,
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmfaff/44/44.pdf
(recommending that Guantanamo be closed as soon as a process could be found to
deal with the detainees in consideration of the “overriding need to protect the
public from terrorist threats”), Alix Kroeger, Euro MPs Urge Guantanamo
Closure, BBC NEWS (June 13, 2006)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5074216.stm. (The European Parliament called
Guantanamo “an anomaly,” and voted “overwhelmingly in favour of a motion
calling on the US to close the Guantanamo Bay detention camp.”)
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Guantanamo Bay.”33 This was the first time the Court recognized
that Guantanamo Bay detainees could appeal to federal courts with a
writ of habeas corpus to challenge their confinement.34 The Court in
Rasul specifically pointed to the power to grant writ under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.35
Two days later, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the Court held that a
United States citizen held at Guantanamo Bay had Due Process
rights: a “meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that
detention before a neutral decision-maker.”36 Though the Court
recognized the argument that requiring such a process might subject
military officers to the “threat of litigation,” the Court dismissed such
concerns because the disputes would be “limited to the alleged
combatant’s acts.” The Court further reasoned that the separation of
powers doctrines did not give a “blank check for the President” to
override constitutional rights or the “constitutionally mandated roles
of reviewing and resolving claims” by federal courts.37 Even during
times of war, the Court elaborated, the Constitution “most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake.”38 However, the Court provided little explanation of the
contours of the due process hearing, and left the definition of the
legal category of enemy combatant for the lower courts.39
After the decision in Hamdi, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
established the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs).40 The
purpose of the CSRTs was “to determine whether individuals
detained at Guantanamo were ‘enemy combatants’ . . . .”41 The
CSRTs were to comply with the due process requirements set out by

33

542 U.S. at 470 (2004).
Joseph Landau, Article, Muscular Procedure: Conditional Deference in the
Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV 661 (2009).
35
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
36
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).
37
Id. at 535-36.
38
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536.
39
Id. at 522, n.1. See also Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the
“War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1048 (2008) (noting that the majority
in Hamdi could not agree on what the procedures for the hearing would be).
40
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733 (2008).
41
Id.
34
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the Court in Hamdi.42 These commissions were to have two parts:
(1) a hearing by the CSRT to determine the status of a detainee, and
if they were deemed an “enemy combatant,” then (2) the detainee
would be eligible for trial by a military commission.43 “An enemy
combatant” was defined as “. . . an individual who was part of or
supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition
partners.” 44 The detainee would be represented by a “personal
representative” and could call any witnesses, but were restricted from
viewing classified evidence “even if it explained ‘how, where and
from whom the information about the accusations supporting the
enemy combatant charge originated.’”45
C.Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and the Military Commissions
Act of 2006
In response to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rasul and
Hamdi, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
(DTA).46 The DTA amended 28 U.S.C § 2241 by adding the new
section (e) to it. The DTA stripped jurisdiction from any “court,
justice, or judge” to hear (1) applications for writs of habeas corpus
filed by aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay and (2) “any other action
against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the
detention . . . .”47 The DTA also vested exclusive review of the
CSRTs’ determination in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.48
Additionally, the DTA contained an “effective date” provision:
(1) IN GENERAL.—This section shall take effect on
the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) REVIEW
OF
COMBATANT
STATUS
TRIBUNAL AND MILITARY COMMISSION

42

Id.
Kness, supra note 22, at 396-97.
44
Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F.Supp.2d 133, 135 (2008).
45
Kness, supra note 22, at 397.
46
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005, PL 109-148, 119 Stat 2680 (2005).
47
Id.
48
Id.
43
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DECISIONS.—Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection
(e) shall apply with respect to any claim whose review
is governed by one of such paragraphs and that is
pending on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act.49
The DTA “place[d] restrictions on the treatment and interrogation
of detainees in U.S. custody,” as well as established protections for
U.S. citizens who have been accused of mistreatment.50 It also
required the Secretary of Defense to provide a report to Congress on
the procedures that the CSRTs, and the Administrative Review
Boards (ARBs), would follow for determining the status of
detainees.51
The Supreme Court countered Congress’s jurisdiction-stripping
provisions in the DTA when it decided Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.52 In
Hamdan, the Court did not expressly overrule the DTA.53 Instead,
the Court concluded that the effective date provision of the DTA did
not expressly apply to pending habeas corpus petitions, only future
petitions.54 Therefore, the Court held that such pending habeas
actions as Hamdan’s could continue.55
D.The Military Commissions Act of 2006 and Boumediene v.
Bush
In Hamdan, the Supreme Court’s decision had not reached the
constitutional rights available to alien detainees of the government.56
Justice Breyer’s separate concurrence, joined by Justices Kennedy,
Souter, and Ginsburg, noted that Hamdan was not the last say on the
issue of how the government should treat the alien detainees.57

49

Id.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572 (2006).
51
119 Stat 2680, see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572.
52
548 U.S. at 557.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 576-585.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006).(Breyer, J., concurring).
50
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Justice Breyer noted that “[n]othing prevents the President from
returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.”58
In fact, President Bush did return to Congress for the necessary
authority, signing into law the Military Commissions Act of 2006
(MCA) on October 17, 2006.59 Section 7(a) of the MCA retained
much of the same language as the DTA, amending § 2241 by adding
in a section (e) that eliminated jurisdiction from any court to hear (1)
“an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an
alien detained by the United States . . . ” and (2) “any other action
against the United States relating to any aspect of the detention,
transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien
who is or was detained by the United States . . . .”60 Congress’s
intent in enacting the MCA was broad. While the DTA only affected
statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction, the MCA was meant to also
include the constitutional writ.61
The MCA was viewed by many as a “harsh rebuke” of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan.62 Unlike in the DTA, the
extent to which habeas corpus should apply to the detainees was

58

Id.
Greenberg, supra note 25, at 811.
60
Military Commissions Act of 2006, PL 109-366, 120 Stat 2600 (October 17,
2006). In full, the MCA provides:
(e)(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed
by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has
been determined by the United States to have been properly
detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such
determination.
59

(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801
note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider any other action against the United States or its agents
relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or
conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by
the United States and has been determined by the United States
to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination. Id.
61
62

Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 2242.
Greenberger, supra note 25, at 812.
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debated thoroughly by Congress when it considered the MCA.63 The
habeas bar of the MCA was only the fifth time in the history of the
United States that the writ had been suspended.64
The passage of the MCA met with immediate criticism from
multiple commentators.65 First, the MCA broadened the personal
jurisdiction of the military commissions to include any alien who was
“part of” the “associated forces” of terrorist organizations, even if
they had not actively engaged in hostilities against United States
forces.66 Also, though the MCA prohibited evidence that was
obtained through torture after December 30, 2005, there was no
prohibition against evidence obtained before that date.67 Even then,
the MCA provided military commission judges great latitude in
admitting statements coerced through cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment.68
The MCA’s harsh jurisdiction-stripping provisions prevented the
alien detainees from challenging their detention, even where the
detainees had no other legal recourse.69 Senator John McCain
decried the fact that the MCA “stripped those detainees of any other
recourse to the U.S. courts for legal actions regarding their detention
63

Id.
Id.
65
See, e.g. Norman Abrams, Developments in US Anti-Terrorism Law, 4 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1117, 1135 (2006); Greenberger, supra note 25, at 812-816;
Kness, supra note 22,
66
Greenberger, supra note 25, at 812 (citing 120 Stat. at 2601, § 3).
67
Id. See also 152 CONG. REC. S10243-01.
68
Id. Military judges could admit such statements depending on when the
statements were made:
Coerced statements elicited prior to the DTA's prohibition of “cruel, inhumane,
or degrading” interrogations are admissible only if the military judge should
conclude that “the totality of the circumstances renders the [coerced] statement
reliable and possessing sufficient probative value” and “the interests of justice
would best be served by admissi[bility].” Statements coerced after passage of the
DTA's McCain Amendment are admissible if the two standards articulated above
are met and “the interrogation methods . . . do not amount to cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment” prohibited, inter alia, by the Eighth Amendment. Thus, by
legislative legerdemain, the protections within the much-lauded McCain
Amendment are redefined merely to prevent conduct violating the quite limited
reach of the Eighth Amendment. Greenberger, supra note 25, at 814 (internal
citations omitted).
69
152 CONG. REC. S10243-01.
64
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or treatment in U.S. custody.”70 The broad, sweeping language of the
MCA eliminated
. . . all other legal rights . . . for . . . aliens, including lawful
permanent residents detained inside or outside the United States who
have been determined by the United States to be the enem[y]. The
only requirement . . . is that the [United States] determine[] that the
alien detainee is an enemy combatant, but the bill provides no
standard for this determination and offers the detainee no ability to
challenge it. Consequently, even aliens who have been released from
U.S. custody . . . would be denied any legal recourse as long as the
United States continues to claim that they were properly held.71
Initially, it was unclear whether the federal courts would find the
jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA unconstitutional. In
Hamad, the Supreme Court did not have to address the
constitutionality of a similar measure in the DTA because the Court
did not find that the DTA stripped it of jurisdiction.72 In December
of 2006, the D.C. District Court decided the remanded case of
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.73 There, the District Court held that the MCA
effectively stripped jurisdiction from the federal courts. But, it was
not unconstitutional, and Hamdan had no access to the writ of habeas
corpus.74 Thus, despite the Supreme Court’s efforts, through Hamdi,
Rasul, and Hamdan, to give the protections of the rule of law to
detainees, the fact that no court had fully addressed what
constitutional protections apply to the detainees meant that the
detainees still lacked the ability to contest their detention.
In 2008, the Supreme Court conclusively established that aliens
detained at Guantanamo had the right to petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in order to challenge their detention.75 The petitioners in
Boumediene were aliens who had been captured in Afghanistan and
70

Id.
Id.
72
“[S]ubsections (e)(2) and (e)(3) [of DTA § 1005] grant jurisdiction only
over actions to ‘determine the validity of any final decision’ of a CSRT or
commission. Because Hamdan . . . is not contesting any ‘final decision’ of a CSRT
or military commission, his action does not fall within the scope of subsection
(e)(2) or (e)(3).” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 583 (2006).
73
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.Supp.2d 9 (D.D.C. 2006).
74
Id.
75
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008).
71
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elsewhere, had been designated as “enemy combatants” by the
CSRTs, and were detained at Guantanamo Bay.76 The petitioners
had applied to the District Court for the District of Columbia for a
writ of habeas corpus.77 Using similar reasoning that it applied in the
remanded Hamdan case,78 the D.C. Court of Appeals held that MCA
§ 7 stripped jurisdiction for any federal court to hear their habeas
petitions, that it was not unconstitutional, and the petitioners had no
right to apply for the writ.79
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the D.C. Court of Appeals, and held that Guantanamo
detainees do have the habeas corpus privilege.80 First, however, the
Supreme Court had to decide whether MCA § 7 denied them
jurisdiction to hear the case at all.81 Unlike the DTA in Hamdan,82
the MCA left “little doubt that the effective date provision applies to
habeas corpus actions.”83 However, the petitioners argued that:
Section 2241(e)(1) refers to “a writ of habeas corpus.” The next
paragraph, § 2241(e)(2), refers to “any other action . . . relating to
any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of
confinement of an alien who ... [has] been properly detained as an
enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.” There are two
separate paragraphs . . . so there must be two distinct classes of cases.
And the effective date subsection, MCA § 7(b) . . . refers only to the
second class of cases, for it largely repeats the language of §
2241(e)(2) by referring to “cases . . . which relate to any aspect of the
detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an
alien detained by the United States.”84
The Court rejected this argument, pointing to the fact that the
phrase “other action” in § 2241(e)(2) can only be understood in
reference to § 2241(e)(1), which mentions “writ of habeas corpus.”85
76

Id. at 734.
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 723.
78
See Hamdan, 464 F.Supp.2d at 9.
79
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 724.
80
Id. at 733.
81
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 736 (2008).
82
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576-85 (2006).
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Boumediene, 553 U.S.at 737.
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Id. at 738.
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Id. at 737. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1)–(2).
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Even though the effective date provision of MCA § 7(b) appeared to
have the same language as § 2241(e)(2),86 the Court held that habeas
actions are a type of action that the structure of the two paragraphs
implies is covered by the effective date provision.87 Pending habeas
actions are therefore covered by § 2241(e)(1); so long as MCA § 7
was constitutionally valid, the petitioner’s claims would have to be
dismissed.88 The Court thus faced two issues: (1) did the
Guantanamo detainees have constitutional rights, and if so, (2) did
the MCA and DTA provide adequate alternative procedures (through
the CSRTs) to the writ of habeas corpus?89
Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy held that the
detainees are protected by the constitutional privilege of habeas
corpus, and that the CSRTs provided an inadequate substitute for the
writ.90 Justice Kennedy explained that the writ of habeas corpus
through the Suspension Clause91 was meant to protect against the
“cyclical abuses” of the Executive and the Legislative branches.92
According to Justice Kennedy, the Suspension Clause was uniquely
important as a tool for the Judiciary to use to enforce the separationof-powers doctrine.93 Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the separationof-powers seemed to guide much of his analysis.94 Thus, Justice
Kennedy rejected the Government’s argument that the “political
question doctrine” required the Court to allow the political branches
to limit habeas corpus jurisdiction based on de jure sovereignty.95
Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Constitution does not grant the
86

Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2), and Military Commissions Act of 2006 §

7(b).
87

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 737 (2008).
Id.
89
Joshua Alexander Geltzer, Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo:
The Reach of the Fifth Amendment After Boumediene and the Relationship
Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 719, 725 (2012).
90
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732–33.
91
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the
Suspension Clause, provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
92
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 745.
93
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745-46 (2008)..
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Id.
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Id.
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political branches “the power to decide when and where its terms
apply,” and that the Government is still constrained by the
restrictions of the Constitution.96 The wider reasoning behind
Boumediene, then, was to defend the reach of the judiciary: “To hold
[that] the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution
on or off at will is . . . a striking anomaly . . . leading to a regime in
which Congress and the President, not this Court, say ‘what the law
is.’”97 However, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the decision by
the Court was a narrow one:
Our decision today holds only that petitioners
before us are entitled to seek the writ; that the DTA
review procedures are an inadequate substitute for
habeas corpus; and that petitioners in these cases need
not exhaust the review procedures in the Court of
Appeals before proceeding with their habeas actions
in the District Court.98
The majority in Boumediene expressly declined to decide whether
the CSRT procedures satisfied due process requirements.99 Indeed,
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the dissent in Boumediene, sharply
criticized the majority for extending the Suspension Clause without
engaging in any due process analysis.100
E. Money Damages Claims By Detainees After Boumediene
After the Supreme Court extended legal rights to detainees
through the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, many
commentators believed that other parts of the Constitution would be
extended to Guantanamo.101 To many commentators, the most likely
constitutional right that would next be extended would be the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.102 The Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause provides that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived

96

Id. at 765.
Id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803)).
98
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795.
99
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008).
100
Id. at 801–02 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
101
See, e.g., Geltzer, supra note 89, at 720.
102
Id.
97
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of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”103 If the
Due Process Clause was found to apply to Guantanamo detainees,
then it would allow alien detainees to be able to pursue claims based
on violations of the Fifth Amendment. More specifically, this would
allow former Guantanamo detainees to pursue civil lawsuits for
compensation in suits known as Bivens actions.
1. Bivens Actions And The “Special Factors Counseling Hesitation”
A Bivens action is a civil suit where the claimant alleges
constitutional violations by federal agents, and is named after the
case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.104 In Bivens, agents from
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics conducted a search of Bivens’
apartment without a warrant or probable cause and recovered
narcotics.105 Bivens sued the agents, alleging that they had violated
his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment.106 The
Supreme Court reasoned that while there is no specific provision in
the Fourth Amendment (or in the Constitution) that provides for
money damages for violations of it, “federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done.”107 Therefore, the
Court held that where a constitutional right has been violated by
federal agents, that person is entitled to recover money damages.108
In what would later become a limiting doctrine to Bivens claims,
the Court noted several “special factors counseling hesitation in the
absence of affirmative action by Congress.”109 The Court listed three
special factors that were areas that were traditionally reserved to
congressional judgment: federal fiscal policy, government-soldier
relationship, and congressional employment.110 The “special factors”
evolved from factors that counseled hesitancy, into a nonjusticiability
doctrine that courts could use to deny a Bivens remedy, especially

103

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
403 U.S. 388 (1971).
105
Id. at 389–90.
106
Id. at 390.
107
Id. at 396 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
108
Id.
109
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
110
Id.
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where a Bivens remedy “might compete with Congress’s statutory
decisions.”111 For example, the Supreme Court refused to infer
Bivens remedies for claims of employment discrimination in
violation of the First Amendment,112 Social Security disability
benefits terminated in violation of the Fifth Amendment,113 and
injuries arising from secret testing of LSD on an officer in the
military in violation of tort law.114
Generally, the “special factors” were considered and used to bar a
judicial remedy where Congress had created a statutory remedy for
specific constitutional violations. However, Wilkie v. Robbins
expanded the “special factors” to include areas where Congress had
not created an express remedial scheme.115 In Wilkie, the Court
refused to create a Bivens remedy where Government employees
harassed, intimidated, and trespassed onto Robbins’ property in an
effort to obtain an easement over his land.116 The Court reasoned
that, even though no federal remedy existed, “Robbins had . . . a wide
variety of [state] administrative and judicial remedies to redress his
injuries.”117 Fearful of “an onslaught of Bivens actions,” the Court
signaled its intent to limit future Bivens actions and instead, defer to
Congress’s legislative judgment to provide or not provide a
remedy.118
2. Bivens Actions By Guantanamo Detainees
In general, most courts have attempted to avoid the issue of
whether the detainees have any right to pursue a damages claim

111

Ian Samson, Boumediene as a Constitutional Mandate: Bivens Actions at
Guantanamo Bay, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 439, 453 (2011).
112
Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 390 (1983).
113
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988).
114
United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 681–84 (1987).
115
551 U.S. 537 (2007).
116
Id. at 541.
117
Id. at 562.
118
Id. See also Samson, supra note 111, at 454.
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based on alleged constitutional violations.119 The D.C. Circuit has
held that the Due Process Clause does not apply to alien detainees,
and that Boumediene was limited to the Suspension Clause.120 In
Rasul v. Myers, also known as Rasul II, the D.C. Circuit held that
Boumediene only invalidated the portion of the MCA that deprived
federal court of habeas corpus jurisdiction, and retained the other
portions, which restricted the detainee’s judicial access.121 In Rasul
II, four British nationals brought an action asserting, among other
claims, Bivens claims for violations of the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments.122 They argued that Boumediene created a “functional
test” that entitled detainees to “fundamental constitutional rights”
unless it was “impracticable and anomalous” to recognize those
rights.123 They further argued that the rights they sought were
constitutional, and it would not be “impracticable and anomalous” to
recognize them.124 However, the D.C. Circuit skirted the issue,
noting the narrow holding of Boumediene: “the Court stressed that its
decision ‘does not address the content of the law that governs
petitioners’ detention.’”125 The Rasul II court interpreted that
statement to mean “Boumediene disclaimed any intention to disturb
existing law governing the extraterritorial reach of any constitutional
provisions, other than the Suspension Clause.”126 Despite this, the

119

Geltzer notes that, wherever possible, the D.C. Circuit has declined to
address the issue of whether the Due Process, or any other constitutional
protections, apply to the detainees. Geltzer, supra note 89, at 740–43.
120
See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir 2009), vacated, 559
U.S. 131 (2010), reinstated by 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir 2010). For a complete
discussion of the Kiyemba case, see Geltzer, supra note 89 at 740–43.
121
563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
122
Id. at 528.
123
Supplemental Brief on Remand of Appellants/Cross Appellees Rasul, et al.,
Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (No. 06-5209, 06-5222), 2009 WL
700174 (C.A.D.C.) at *1.
124
Id.
125
Rasul, 563 F.3d. at 529 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797
(2008)). Samson noted that the Rasul II court ignored the following sentence,
which stated that the issue of what constitutional provisions apply “is a matter yet
to be determined.” Samson, supra note 111, at 459 (quoting Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 797).
126
Rasul, 563 F.3d at 529.
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D.C. Circuit did not rule on whether any constitutional provisions
applied to the detainees.127 Instead, the court dismissed the Bivens
claims based on qualified immunity.128 Rasul II thus stood as the
“definitive opinion on Boumediene in the D.C. Circuit,” interpreting
Boumediene to provide no constitutional rights to be violated for a
Bivens claim.129
3. The Blueprint For The Ninth Circuit: Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez
In 2012, the D.C. Circuit took the analysis that had begun in
Rasul II to its full conclusion in Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, and held
that Boumediene did not overrule 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2).130 AlZahrani was an action brought by the representatives of Yasser AlZahrani and Salah Ali Abdullah, citizens of Saudi Arabia and
Yemen, respectively, who were detained at Guantanamo.131 The two
had died at Guantanamo under disputed circumstances.132 Their
representatives sought money damages in a Bivens action, alleging
violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, among other
claims.133 Relying on the D.C. Circuit’s prior decision in Rasul II,
the D.C. District Court did not reach the constitutionality of the
MCA, and instead dismissed the Bivens claims based on qualified
immunity.134 However, as opposed to the earlier decision in Rasul II,
the D.C. Circuit chose to directly address whether the provisions of
the MCA, which purported to strip jurisdiction from federal courts
for non-habeas actions, survived Boumediene.135 First, the D.C.

127
Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009).. “[W]e should not decide
whether Boumediene portends application of the Due Process Clause and Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause to Guantanamo detainees.”Id.
128
Id.
129
Samson, supra note 111, at 457.
130
Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
131
Id. at 317.
132
Josh White, Guards’ Lapses Cited in Detainee Suicides, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Aug. 23, 2008) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/22/AR2008082203083_pf.html.
133
Al-Zahrani, 669 F.3d at 318.
134
Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F.Supp.2d 103, 110-13 (D.D.C. 2010).
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Circuit noted that Boumediene was an appeal from their own court,
involving “a decision applying the first subsection of § 7 governing
and barring the hearing of applications for writs of habeas corpus
filed by detained aliens.”136 Applying similar logic as it had applied
in Rasul II, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that much of the Supreme
Court’s decision focused on the Suspension Clause.137 Additionally,
the D.C. Circuit argued that § 2241(e)(2) governed the case, and had
“no effect on habeas jurisdiction.”138 The D.C. Circuit also rejected
the argument that § 2241(e)(2) unconstitutionally barred remedies for
violations of constitutional rights.139
Significantly, the court asserted that money remedies “are not
constitutionally required.”140
Utilizing the “special factors”
analysis,141 the court chose not to extend a Bivens remedy to the
detainees.142 Therefore, the court said, “the Supreme Court used a
scalpel and not a bludgeon,” and thus § 2241(e)(2) continued to have
effect.143
III. FACTS
In 2002, Adel Hassan Hamad, appellant, a resident and citizen of
Sudan,144 was captured in Pakistan by Pakistani security forces
“acting under the direction of an ‘unknown American official.’”145
Hamad claims he was a humanitarian aid worker for the World
Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY),146 a Saudi Arabian-funded

136

Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
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See supra, Part II, section E, subsection b.
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Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669 F.3d 315, 320 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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Notice of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
and Improper Venue, or, in the Alternative, for Transfer, and Memorandum of
Points and Authority in Support Thereof.
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Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 2013).
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organization that has been accused of being “a discreet channel for . .
. donations to hardline Islamic organisations.”147 Hamad was
transferred by the Pakistani security forces to the U.S. military,
which detained him first at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, then at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.148 He claims that while he was detained, he
“was subjected to prolonged arbitrary detention, cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment . . . [and] torture.”149
In March 2005, a divided Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT) determined that Hamad was an “enemy combatant.”150 In
November 2005, an Administrative Review Board (ARB) panel
reviewed the detention of Hamad and determined that while he
continued to be “a threat to the United States and its allies,” he was
eligible to be transferred to Sudan.151 However, he only received
notice that he was eligible in February 2007.152 After obtaining an
agreement with Sudan as to the conditions of his transfer,153 in
December 2007, Hamad was transferred to Sudan.154 He was never
charged with any crime at any point in his detention.155
After his release, in 2010, Hamad filed a claim in federal court
for money damages against twenty-two named military and civilian
government officials, including former Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates, and 100 other unnamed officials.156 He alleges that these
officials were acting outside the scope of their employment and in

2014), http://www.andyworthington.co.uk/2007/12/14/the-shocking-stories-of-thesudanese-humanitarian-aid-workers-just-released-from-guantanamo/.
147
Greg Palast & David Pallister, FBI Claims Bin Laden Inquiry Was
Frustrated, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 7, 2001, 11:31 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/07/afghanistan.september11.
148
Hamad, 732 F.3d at 993.
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Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint at 35, Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990 (2013)
Nos. 12-35395, 12-35489.
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Hamad, 732 F.3d at 994.
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Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2013).
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their individual capacities.157 Hamad raised six claims under state
common law, the Alien Tort Statute,158 international law, and the
Geneva Conventions.159 His six claims were for (1) prolonged
arbitrary detention; (2) cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; (3)
torture; (4) targeting of a civilian; (5) violation of due process; and
(6) forced disappearance.160 In addition, Hamad’s second amended
complaint alleged a seventh claim for damages for violation of due
process under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.161 His claims were based on his alleged wrongful
detention, torture, and mistreatment during his initial detention in
Pakistan and at Bagram Airfield, as well as during his transportation
to and detention at Guantanamo Bay.162 Hamad sought a judgment
for compensatory damages, exemplary and punitive damages, and
attorneys’ fees from the defendants.163
IV.PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Hamad filed his action in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington.164 The district court dismissed all
other defendants except for Defense Secretary Gates for lack of
personal jurisdiction.165 The district court also granted the
government’s motion to substitute itself for Gates for the first six
claims under the Westfall Act.166
157

Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2013).
28 U.S.C. § 1350.
159
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for Damages Hamad, 732 F.3d 990
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160
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Id.
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Id. at 995; see also Hamad v. Gates, No. C10-591 MJP, 2012 WL 1253167,
at *7 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2012) vacated and remanded, 732 F.3d 990 (9th Cir.
2013)
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First, the District Court addressed whether Gates was protected
by the qualified immunity doctrine.167 The government argued that
Gates was protected by qualified immunity168 because, at the time
Hamad was detained, there was a “‘lack of case law’ establishing the
Due Process rights of Guantanamo detainees.”169 The District Court
rejected this argument, finding that a “reasonable federal official
would know that detaining a person, after determining he is eligible
for release, violates a clearly established constitutional right.”170
Additionally, the District Court found that Boumediene struck down
§ 2241(e) in its entirety–both the section that “strip[ped] federal
jurisdiction over habeas petitions [subsection (e)(1)] and the
subsection that stripped federal jurisdiction over Bivens actions
[subsection (e)(2)].”171 Therefore, the District Court reasoned,
Boumediene recognized that full constitutional protections extend to
Guantanamo detainees.
However, the District Court agreed with the government’s second
argument that Hamad failed to allege in his complaint that Gates was
“personally involved in violating Hamad’s constitutional rights.”172
The District Court rejected Hamad’s four factual allegations as
“weak” and “not enough to meet Iqbal’s plausibility standard.”173
which the claim arose, any civil action or
proceeding commenced upon such claim in a
United States district court shall be deemed an
action against the United States . . . and the
United States shall be substituted as the party
defendant.
167
Hamad, 2012 WL 1253167, at *2.
168
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)). For a
government official to be protected by qualified immunity, the court has discretion
to consider one or both steps of a two-step inquiry: (1) the official violated a
constitutional right and/or (2) the right was “clearly established” at the time. Id.
169
Id. at *3.
170
Id. at *5.
171
Hamad v. Gates, No. C10-591 MJP, 2012 WL 1253167, at *3 (W.D. Wash.
Apr. 13, 2012) vacated and remanded, 732 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2013)
172
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The District Court held that while it was “possible Gates knew
Hamad was unlawfully detained,” it was not plausible. Therefore,
the District Court rejected Hamad’s last claim and dismissed it.174
V. ANALYSIS OF OPINION
The Ninth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) deprived the
court of subject- matter jurisdiction to hear Hamad’s claims.175 First,
it considered whether the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush had
struck down all of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 2241(e),
and it held that it did not.176 Next, the court then concluded that
(e)(2) was severable from (e)(1).177 Finally, the court held that §
2241(e)(2) was constitutional as applied to Hamad.178
A. Did Boumediene Strike Down All of § 2241(e)?
The court first addressed whether the District Court had subjectmatter jurisdiction over Hamad’s claim, despite the jurisdictionstripping provisions of § 2241(e). The court outlined the five
requirements that § 2241(e)(2) sets for a federal court to lack
jurisdiction over an action:
(1) the action is “against the United States or its agents”;
(2) the action relates to “any aspect of the detention, transfer,
treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or
was detained by the United States”;
(3) the action relates to an alien who was “determined by the
United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant
or is [an alien] awaiting such a determination”;
(4) the action is an action “other” than an application for a writ of
habeas corpus . . . and

174

Id. at *7.
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(5) the action does not qualify for an exception under §
1005(e)(2) or (3) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005(DTA)179,
which provide the D.C. Circuit jurisdiction over a narrow class of
challenges by enemy combatants.180
Looking at the five requirements, the court held that Hamad’s
action met each of them.181 Since § 2241(e)(2) “applie[d] by its
terms,”182 the court next considered whether Boumediene struck
down all of § 2241, or only referred to the subdivision stripping
jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions.183 First, the court reviewed
the historical backdrop of Supreme Court precedent, Congressional
legislation, and Presidential actions which lead to Hamad’s
argument.184 The court noted that because Boumediene’s holding
focused primarily on Congress’s authority to suspend habeas corpus
at Guantanamo Bay, it did not analyze the constitutionality of §
2241(e)(2).185 Additionally, Boumediene did not address whether
any other constitutional provisions applied to Guantanamo
detainees.186 Hamad argued that because the Supreme Court did not
expressly differentiate between § 2241(e)(1) and (2), Boumediene
should be read to strike down all of § 2241(e).187 However, the Ninth
Circuit disagreed, stating that the “logic and context of the opinion
make clear that the Supreme Court was addressing only §
2241(e)(1).”188 The Supreme Court’s rationale in invalidating §
2241(e), according to the Ninth Circuit, was that the section deprived
the detainees of habeas corpus review which unconstitutionally
violated the Suspension Clause.189 This rationale has no relation to
subsection (e)(2), which relates to any other action other than habeas

179

See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119
Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005).
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corpus.190 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit cited specific language in
Boumediene that limited the decision to the suspension of the writ of
habeas.191 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the decision in
Boumediene could not have struck § 2241(e)(2) down.192
B. Is § 2241(e)(2) Severable From § 2241(e)(1)?
Next, the court considered whether § 2241(e)(2) was severable
from § 2241(e)(1).
Hamad argued in his brief that Sections 2241(e)(1) and (e)(2) are
textually interdependent, and that (e)(2) cannot stand alone.193 He
pointed to language in Boumediene which he argued demonstrated
that the Court “understood the distinction between (e)(1) and (e)(2),
but chose to strike both sections down as unconstitutional.”194
Additionally, Hamad argued that if Section 2241(e)(2) were left
standing, but (e)(1) were removed, the phrase “other action” would
refer to a non-existing paragraph and it would still preclude habeas
corpus actions.195 The court rejected these arguments.196 First, the
court noted that generally, courts should not invalidate more of a
statute than necessary because “‘[a] ruling of unconstitutionality
frustrates the intent of the elected representatives.’”197 Citing
Supreme Court precedent, the presumption when a statute is ruled
unconstitutional is that the enactment is severable from the rest of the

190
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statute.198 The court outlined the three-part Booker severability test,
and then applied it to Section 2241.199 The severability test, as
outlined in Booker, requires courts to retain portions of statutes that
are “(1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of functioning
independently, and (3) consistent with Congress’ basic objectives in
enacting the statute.”200
Beginning with the second inquiry of the Booker test, which
views whether the statute could function independently, the court
believed that the two provisions of § 2241(e) are capable of
functioning independently.201 The Ninth Circuit focused on the fact
that the statute focused on two separate categories of actions that
Guantanamo detainees could bring.202 According to the Ninth
Circuit, it was “apparent” that Boumediene’s conclusion only
addressed habeas actions, and so nothing prevented § 2241(e)(2)
from independently barring non-habeas action.203
The court then addressed Hamad’s argument that the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of § 7(a) and (b) of the MCA shows that §
2241(e)(2) cannot function independently from § 2241(e)(1). In
Boumediene, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner’s argument
that § 7(b) of the MCA applied only to non-habeas actions, reasoning
that the phrase “any other action” in § 2241(e)(2) must be read in
reference to § 2241(e)(1).204 Hamad argued that because the
Supreme Court’s reasoning shows that § 2241(e)(2) must be read in
reference to § 2241(e)(1), and therefore cannot function
independently.205 The court disagreed, noting that a subsection of a
statute is still able to function even if it can only be understood by
referencing an inoperative part of the statute.206 Therefore, the court
198

Id. at 1001, see Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685-86

(1987).
199

Hamad, 732 F.3d at 1001.
Id. (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258-59 (2005)). The
basis of the severability is the intent of Congress in enacting the statute. Alaska
Airlines, 480 U.S. at 685.
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held that § 2241(e)(2) was fully operative because it bars jurisdiction
over the subset of cases not covered by § 2241(e)(1).207
The court then addressed the third prong of Booker, which is
whether the retained portion of the statute is consistent with
Congress’s basic objectives in enacting the statute.208 Again, the
court referred to the statute itself to show that Congress had two
concerns: one was “to bar alien detainees from applying for habeas
corpus,” and the other was to prevent alien detainees from bringing
any other type of action related to their detention or treatment.209
The court then reasoned that, based on the history of Congress’s
responses to Supreme Court decisions210, Congress’s basic objective
“was to limit detainee’s access to the courts.”211 After briefly
reviewing the Supreme Court decisions and Congress’s responses to
each,212 the court concluded that § 2241(e)(2) was consistent with
Finally, the court rejected Hamad’s
Congress’s objective.213
argument that the absence of a severability clause meant that
Congress did not intend the provisions to be severable.214 Citing
Alaska Airlines,215 the court stated that it was “evident” that the two
provisions were severable, in light of the text and historical
background.216 Therefore, the court concluded § 2241(e)(2) was
severable from § 2241(e)(1), and would therefore bar Hamad’s action
so long as it was constitutional.217
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C. Is § 2241(e)(2) Unconstitutional As Applied to Hamad?
Finally, the court examined Hamad’s arguments that § 2241(e)(2)
was unconstitutional, and therefore should have no effect.218 Hamad
argued that the statute unconstitutionally deprived him of a federal
forum to seek a remedy for violations of his constitutional rights:
“Article III demands some federal court review . . . over all federal
question claims.”219 He argued that the Supreme Court has the
“strongest of presumptions” against statutes that completely
precludes access to federal courts for constitutional claims, and has in
fact never upheld such a preclusion.220 Finally, Hamad argued that §
2241(e) was a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers221 and
that it precludes claims based on state law as well, thereby violating
the principle of federalism.222
The Court began its analysis by agreeing with Hamad that the
Supreme Court has avoided whether Congress may deny access to
federal court to seek a remedy for violations of constitutional
rights.223 However, the Court also chose to avoid the question as
well, stating that the Constitution does not require the availability of
money damages, which is the only remedy that Hamad sought.224
The court referred to the Supreme Court’s Bivens cases, noting that a
Bivens damages remedy is “not an automatic entitlement . . . to
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220
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vindicate a protected interest.”225 The court then cited several
different contexts where the Supreme Court declined to recognize a
Bivens remedy.226 Thus, the court held that “money damages are not
constitutionally required for every violation of constitutional rights”
and thus § 2241(e)(2) is not unconstitutional as applied to Hamad’s
claim.227
Next, Hamad argued that § 2241(e) is an unconstitutional bill of
attainder because it strips a discrete class of individuals, alien
detainees, of access to courts.228 Under the Bill of Attainder
Clause,229 a bill of attainder is any “legislative punishment, of any
form or severity, of specifically designated persons or groups.”230 A
bill of attainder has three elements: “the statute (1) specifies the
affected persons, and (2) inflicts punishment (3) without a judicial
trial.”231 Since a statute must demonstrate “‘unmistakable evidence
of punitive intent’ before it may be struck down as a bill of
attainder,” the main issue was whether the statute inflicted legislative
punishment.232 Hamad argued that denying a class access to the
courts is the type of punishment that has been historically recognized

225
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as a form of legislative punishment.233 Hamad tried to distinguish his
case from that of Nagac v. Derwinski,234 arguing that the statute in
Nagac which restricted access to the courts did not fully restrict
access, “only the exclusivity of which court could hear review” of
veteran’s administrative decisions.235 Additionally, Hamad argued
that the Congressional record showed that Congress intended to
punish Guantanamo Bay detainees for exercising their habeas
rights,236 whereas the record in Nagac did not demonstrate a desire to
punish veterans.237
However, the court rejected Hamad’s arguments, and held that §
2241(e)(2) is not a bill of attainder.238 The court found Nagac
persuasive, and cited it for the proposition that “[j]urisdictional
limitations, such as the limitations imposed by § 2241(e)(2), do not
fall within the historical meaning of legislative punishment.”239
According to the court, the purpose of the statute was not to impose
punishment, but to limit review of the ARB and military commission
decisions.240 Since the court saw no “unmistakable evidence of
punitive intent,” the court held that § 2241(e)(2) was not a bill of
attainder.241
Lastly, Hamad argued that § 2241(e) should be struck down as an
unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
233

Third Brief on Cross-Appeal, at 21. Hamad referred to the post-Civil War
case of Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1866). In that case, the Supreme
Court struck down certain amendments of the Missouri constitution which
prohibited a person from engaging in certain professions unless they took an oath
that they had no part in the rebellion. Cummings, 71 U.S. at 282-83. The Court
struck down the amendments as bills of attainder because they inflicted legislative
punishment on people of those professions whom had participated in the rebellion
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Amendment.242 He argued that access to the courts is a “fundamental
right,”243 and since § 2241(e) prevents access to the courts, it is
subject to strict scrutiny.244 Hamad argued that because the statute
prevents “enemy combatants” from bringing specified actions in
courts, while imposing “no comparable legal disabilities” on anyone
else, § 2241(e) would not survive strict scrutiny.245
Considering Hamad’s argument, the court noted that the Supreme
Court has never decided whether the Fifth Amendment protections
apply to Guantanamo detainees.246 However, the court “assum[ed],
without deciding, that the Fifth Amendment’s protections apply to
aliens detained outside the United States” because according to the
court, § 2241(e) did not violate the Due Process Clause.247 Since §
2241 clearly made a distinction between aliens and citizens, the main
issue for the court was what standard of review should be applied to
the classification.248 While individual states have “substantial
limitations . . . in making classifications based upon alienage,”249 the
court noted that Congress has “broad authority” to make such
classifications for a variety of reasons.250 Touching on the political
question doctrine, the court noted that the authority to legislate,
regarding aliens, is so closely tied to foreign policy and war powers
that “[s]uch matters are . . . largely immune from judicial inquiry or
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interference.”251 Therefore, the court decided to analyze the alienage
classification of § 2241(e)(2) under the rational basis test.252 Under
the rational basis test, the court reviewed whether the classification
was rationally related to a legitimate government interest.253 In
United States v. Lopez-Flores,254 the court applied the rational basis
test to uphold the Hostage Taking Act, where certain conduct was
criminalized when there was a foreign perpetrator or victim, but not
when either were United States nationals.255 In Lopez-Flores, the
court found that the Hostage Taking Act was “clearly intended to
serve Congress’ legitimate foreign policy concerns.”256 Like the
Hostage Taking Act, Congress’s focus on alien detainees in §
2241(e)(2) is the type of decisions that are “at the core of Congress’s
authority.”257 The court found that Congress had legitimate foreign
policy concerns that members of the armed forces would be targeted
by damages claims for conducting the war on terror.258 Therefore,
the court held that § 2241(e)(2) passed the rational basis review; and
therefore, did not violate the Due Process Clause.259
Since the court rejected or dismissed all of Hamad’s arguments,
the court upheld § 2241(e)(2) to preclude Hamad’s claim.260
Therefore, the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and did
not consider any of Hamad’s other arguments.261
VI. IMPACT
This section explores the impact of the Ninth Circuit’s
interpretation of Boumediene on future claims by detainees. The
Ninth Circuit’s holding represents a broader issue that will have an
251

Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 1005 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Mathews v.
Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, at 81 n. 17 (1976)).
252
Id.
253
Id. at 1006.
254
United States v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1995).
255
Id. at 1470-72.
256
Id. at 1470.
257
Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013).
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Id.

Fall 2015

Hamad v. Gates

477

impact on many future cases. Federal courts have been “categorically
hostile to damages claims arising out of post-September 11
conterterrorism policies.”262 Hamad represents an extension of the
logic that the D.C. Circuit created in Al-Zahrani, which is, that the
Boumediene holding only pertained to the jurisdictional bar on
habeas claims and nothing else. This section will explain the legal
implications of Hamad, specifically, the court’s interpretation of the
Boumediene holding, the implications of the court’s use of the
severability test to uphold § 2241(e)(2) separately from § 2241(e)(1),
and the court’s holding that rejected a Bivens claim for Guantanamo
detainees. This section will also explore the potential social impacts,
especially considering recent government admissions that it tortured
detainees and the actions of other governments around the world that
have given money damages for detainees.
A. Bivens Actions And The “Special Factors Counseling
Hesitation”
The decision in Hamad interpreted the Supreme Court’s holding
as only relevant to bars on habeas corpus claims. However, many
commentators believe that the Boumediene decision was much
broader than the interpretation that the Ninth Circuit, and other
circuits, have come to rely on Boumedine. Joshua Geltzer argued,
“the logic of Boumediene itself suggests that” the Ninth Circuit
should have come to a different conclusion.263 Geltzer posited that
there are five different manners in which the Suspension Clause and
the Due Process Clause relate to each other: 1) habeas provides
jurisdiction for federal courts, while the Due Process clause provides
the basis for substantive rights, 2) habeas review provides the remedy
to the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause, 3) habeas
offers minimal due process rights of its own, 4) habeas review
provides a structural guarantee to balance the powers of the
government, while Due Process protects individual rights, and 5)
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habeas is a form of equitable relief, while Due Process is distinct.264
The Hamad court seems to have taken the first view, that the
Boumediene decision was Suspension Clause specific, in that it only
served to provide jurisdiction for the courts to hear the detainee’s
cases, and nothing more.265 However, a more careful reading of
Boumediene seems to suggest otherwise. Much of the decision by
the Supreme Court seems to emphasize that the Court wished to
protect the separation-of-powers doctrine, and ensure that the Court
would be the one to interpret “what the law is.”266 As Geltzer wrote,
Boumediene “suggests that the decision emerged in significant part
from an emphasis on ensuring that the political branches could not
deliberately operate in the absence of the judiciary.”267 Thus, a
reading of Boumediene suggests that Due Process protections should
apply to Guantanamo detainees would not be inconsistent with the
Court’s intentions in Boumediene.
Despite this, the Ninth Circuit decided to limit its reading of
Boumediene to only apply to habeas corpus jurisdiction, and nothing
else. This interpretation has had significant impact in the analysis of
nearly every Circuit court that has heard non-habeas claims from
detainees.268 The Ninth Circuit’s holding is therefore not anomalous,
and it is likely that such an interpretation is likely to continue. In fact,
in subsequent litigation, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning has been
specifically utilized.
Al-Nashiri v. McDonald is one such case where the Ninth Circuit
has continued the logic which guided it in Hamad.269 Al-Nashiri
involved a similar claim brought buy a former Guantanamo detainee
seeking a Bivens remedy for violations of his constitutional rights.270
In a brief statement, the court cited its previous decision in Hamad to
uphold § 2241(e)(2) and bar jurisdiction to hear his claim.271
Similarly to Hamad as well, the court used this reasoning to reject his
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claim, without reaching the merits. Just as in Hamad, the court
rejected Al-Nashiri’s arguments that § 2241(e)(2) violated his rights
to equal protection and constituted a bill of attainder.272 This case
demonstrates that the decision in Hamad would continue to bar any
sort of judicial relief for Guantanamo detainees.
The court in Hamad not only upheld § 2241(e)(2) separately from
§ 2241(e)(1), it did so by ruling that denial of a Bivens claim is not
unconstitutional.273 The reasoning that the court used, however, and
which has been used by the D.C. Circuit in Al-Zahrani, Rasul II, and
most recently in Janko v. Gates,274 is likely to affect all future Bivens
type claims in the future. In Hamad, the court never reached the
substantive issues on the merits of Hamad’s Bivens claim.275 Instead,
the court held that money damages are never constitutionally
required where constitutional rights have been violated.276 The
problem with this holding, as Steve Vladeck points out, is that “the
Supreme Court has never, in fact, squarely held that damages
remedies for constitutional claims are never constitutionally
required.”277 In every case that the Court has rejected Bivens claims,
there has always been at least some form of remedial scheme.278 The
detainees, under the decisions reached in Hamad and others, have no
forum that they could seek a remedy–no federal statutory scheme nor
any state remedies in torts or otherwise. This holding suggests a
reading that would apply in cases other than Guantanamo detainee
cases: “if there is no constitutional right to a Bivens claim in all
cases, then there can be no constitutional problem with Congress
foreclosing jurisdiction in all such cases.”279

272

Id.
Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2013).
274
Janko v. Gates, 741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
275
See Hamad, 732 F.3d at 1003-04.
276
Id. at 1004.
277
Steve Vladeck, Another (Dubious) Guantanamo Precedent, JUST SECURITY
(January 31, 2014) http://justsecurity.org/6608/dubious-guantanamo-precedent/.
278
Id.
279
Vladeck, supra note 263.
273

480

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

35-2

VII. CONCLUSION
As Senator Dianne Feinstein stated, it is important to remember
“the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how immediate the threat felt. . .
Nevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist
plots do not justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken by
individuals or organizations in the name of national security.”280 The
United States government has admitted that what it did in the years
after September 11, 2001 to suspected terrorists constituted torture in
contravention of international laws and the laws of the U.S. Despite
this, not one person who was responsible for this blight on American
history has been held accountable. The judicial hostility to damages
claim by the detainees reflects a more general hostility by the courts
to hold the government accountable for its counterterrorism
abuses.281 These cases, though decided in the name of national
security, put the American public at greater risk. Firstly, they have
the effect of condoning governmental abuses.282 Secondly, they
create uncertainty, because the courts have not adjudicated the merits
of the claims.283 And finally, the strenuous efforts of the courts to
reject Bivens remedies for detainees may have the unintentional
effect of encouraging the Government to preclude other meritorious
constitutional claims.284 It is unlikely that the analysis that guided
the Ninth Circuit in Hamad will change among the circuit courts
hearing these claims. A favorable Supreme Court ruling will likely
only change the severe implications of these holdings.
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